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Abstract
Schiff considers the policy options of the West Bank and  transparent,  and enforced by a credible lock-in
Gaza with respect to trade and the export of labor  mechanism.  Otherwise,  a customs union with Israel  may
services.  He concludes that:  be preferable.
* Nondiscriminatory  trade policy is unambiguously  * The Palestinian Authority should establish a system
superior to  a free  trade agreement with Israel.  of fee-based permits for Palestinians working in Israel.
* The West Bank and Gaza should pursue a  * The Palestinian Authority should consider allowing
nondiscriminatory trade  policy with all its neighbors, but  Jordanians access to the West Bank and Gaza labor
only on the condition that the trade  policy be open,  market.
This paper-a product of Trade, Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the group to analyze trade and
regional integration policies in the Middle East. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street
NW, Washington,  DC 20433.  Please contact  Paulina Flewitt, room MC3-333,  telephone 202-473-2724,  fax 202-522-
1159,  email address  pflewitt@worldbank.org.  Policy Research  Working Papers  are  also posted  on the Web at http,lH
econ.worldbank.org.  The author may be contacted  at mschiff@worldbank.org.  April 2002. (38 pages)
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work  in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about
development issues.  An objective of the series  is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations  are less than  fully polisbed.  The
papers carry the names of the authors  and sbould be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations,  and conclusions expressed in this
paper  are entirely those of the autbors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors,  or the
countries they represent. 
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1. Introduction
Until  1993,  Israel  exercised  full authority over the  West Bank and Gaza (WBG),
including over the WBG trade policy.  In 1993, the Israeli government and the Palestinian
Authority  (PA)  signed the  Declaration  of Principles  (known as  the  Oslo  accord).  This
provided  the  PA with  authority over  parts  of WBG  and required  the  establishment  of
economic relations between Israel and the PA.  The 1994 Protocol  on Economic Relations
(referred  to  as the  Paris  Protocol)  laid  out transitional  economic  arrangements  for the
period  until  the  final  status  stage  between  Israel  and  the  Palestinians.  This  paper
examines  what  economic  arrangements  would  best  serve  WBG  once  that  stage  is
reached.  The focus is on trade policy, both with Israel and with the rest of the world, and
on exports of labor services.
The WBG policy options are constrained by the fact that it is highly integrated with
the Israeli  economy,  both through  trade  and through  the labor market.  WBG  imports  a
total of $3.2 billion, $2.4 billion or 75% of which  is imported from Israel  (all figures are
for 1998).'  WBG exports a total of about $730 million, with close to $700 million or 96%
exported to Israel.  WBG  has a  GDP of $4.25  billion (about  5%  of that of Israel)  and  a
GNP of about $5 billion.  The difference  between the two is due to the fact that some 20%
of the Palestinian labor force typically works in Israel (before the recent intifada). Income
per  capita is higher in the West Bank than in Gaza, and is about  $1,700  for WBG  as a
whole, or about  10% of that of Israel.
The various policy options to be considered  by WBG have economic  implications
as well  as implications with respect to  sovereignty  and political  control.  As  far  as trade
policies  with  Israel are  concerned,  a customs  union (CU)  provides less political  control
for WBG than a free trade  agreement (FTA),  and an FTA provides less political  control
1  1998 is  the most recent year with a more complete set of trade and other figures for WBG. Not all imports
from Israel are Israeli products, as discussed later.
3than a non-discriminatory  trade policy  (NDTP).2 A NDTP treats Israel  the same  as any
country  with which  WBG  has no  preferential  agreement  (thus  charging Israel  the MFN
tariff).3 In addition to trade policy,  policy options examined  include those  related to the
export of labor services to Israel,  as well as a brief section on currency.
An early study on WBG by Fischer et al.  (1994) examined labor, fiscal, monetary,
financial and foreign aid aspects,  and provided a set of sensible policy recommendations.
In trade,  it recommends  integration of Israel,  WBG and Jordan,  with an  FTA in goods,
services, capital  and technology. The recommendation is based on the view that free trade
provides the best opportunities  for growth in the region.
Though  this advice  may  seem to  make  eminent  sense,  it should  be recalled  that
FTAs as well as other types of regional agreements  are "second-best"-type  policies, and
assessing  the  welfare  impact  of moving  from  one  second  best  (the  existing  CU)  to
another one (the recommended FTA) is never simple. First, an FTA between Israel, WBG
and  Jordan  is  not  the  same  as  free  trade  since  trade  under  an  FTA  is  not  free  with
excluded  regions.  Second,  implementation  of an  FTA  entails  a number of complexities
that  require  careful  examination.  This paper  examines  various policy  options  regarding
trade and exports of labor services,  and examines the costs and benefits of each.
The  WBG  currently  has  a (modified)  customs  union (CU)  with Israel.  This paper
examines various trade policy options whose costs and benefits are summarized  in Table
1. The alternative trade policy options for WBG that are considered are:
i) the  continuation of the CU, with  or without  improved  sharing of revenues  from
tariffs and other trade taxes;
ii) a free trade agreement (FTA) with Israel;
iii) a non-discriminatory  trade policy (NDTP); and
2  A  FTA frees  trade between the member  countries of the  FTA while each maintains  its own trade policy
with respect to excluded countries.  A CU also frees trade between member countries but constrains them to
a common external  trade policy. The latter typically entails  detailed negotiations  between them and  implies
a  greater  loss  of  sovereignty  than  a  FTA.  NDTP  implies  that  a  country  determines  its  trade  policy
unilaterally and provides no preferential access to anyone.
4iv) an FTA between WBG and Jordan.
Table  1 summarizes the costs and benefits of the various trade policy options.
The  paper  concludes  that  the  trade  regime  of  conditional  non-discrimination
("conditional  NDTP")  is  likely to provide  the  greatest economic  benefits  to the WBG.
Thus,  the  scheme  that  is viewed  as  economically  most  beneficial  also  provides  WBG
with the greatest degree  of political  control.  The policy is  referred  to as a "conditional
NDTP"  because  its  choice  is conditional  on liberalizing  the trade  regime  of WBG and
applying  a number  of restrictions in order to prevent any backsliding of its trade policy,
including  binding  tariffs  at  applied  levels  at  the  WTO  and  implementing  credible
mechanisms to prevent the use of anti-dumping and other restrictive non-tariff measures.
The NDTP  option is unlikely to be optimal if these conditions  are not met. In that
case, because of the discipline  it provides, a CU with Israel may be preferable,  assuming
trade  and  other  taxes  are  shared  more  equitably.  Finally,  whatever  the  trade  policy
arrangement  with  Israel,  the  paper  recommends  that  the  Palestinian  Authority  (PA)
establish a system of fee-based permits that Palestinian labor must obtain in order to work
in Israel,  and  that it consider  allowing  access by  Jordanian  workers  to the  WBG labor
market.
Costs and  benefits  of the various  policies have  been estimated.  The  estimates  are
only approximations  because  some  of the  underlying  figures  are  not known  with  any
great degree  of precision and some of the  costs and benefits  cannot  be estimated  at all.
However,  none  of the paper's  conclusions  depend on the precision  of these  estimates,
which  should  be  seen  as providing  some  orders  of magnitude  and  some  clarity  to  the
analysis.
The  paper  also  assumes  that  the issue  of high transactions  costs  associated  with
security checks and border closure will have been resolved in the final status stage.  This
assumption  seems plausible for a situation where peace has been established,  is accepted
3  The MFN or most-favored-nation  principle, the basic principle underlying the GATT and the WTO,  states
that a country will treat  all countries  equally  from the viewpoint of access to its  markets,  i.e.,  it will not
5by both populations and trust prevails.  However, even after a formal peace agreement has
been  signed,  reaching  such a situation  may take time,  and until  then transactions  costs
associated  with  security  may  be  important.  In  the  case  of the  former  Yugoslavia,
Kaminski and de la Rocha (2001)  show that trade among its constituent  republics has so
far  not  returned  to  its  pre-war  level,  though  this  may  also  be  due  to  the  war-related
destruction  of productive  resources.  In any  case, though  security aspects  are  important,
their effect  is impossible to predict with any degree of precision (except to say that lack
of security will have  important  costs  for  both Israel  and WBG).  However,  one can  say
something about how changes  in transactions costs affect the choice between the various
trade policy options. This is done in Section 3.1.5 below.
Panagariya and Diwan (1997)  and others have also recommended,  as part of a new
trade policy for WBG,  that Gaza be converted  into  a free port (Hong Kong-style).  This
paper would only stress that its success will hinge critically on a host of related policies.
The establishment  of a free port requires important investments,  including a world-class
port, warehousing  facilities,  communications  and other infrastructure,  the acquisition  of
specific  skills,  and  more.  The  free  port  also  requires  simple  and  transparent  rules  and
regulations,  efficient  public  administration  and  streamlined  public  services.  If such  a
policy is put into place, WBG is likely to benefit.  On the other hand, if transactions costs
remain  high  due  to  cumbersome,  non-transparent  rules  and  widespread  rent-seeking
activities, WBG will end up with large  sunk costs and little return to show for it.
This  assessment  seems  confirmed  by  Rao  (2000).  He  examined  forty three  free
zones in the Middle East.  The sample included commercial,  export processing,  industrial
and mixed zones,  both public or private.  Rao provides  detailed reasons  for the generally
poor performance  of these zones.  The major reason identified  is the  uncompetitive  and
restrictive policy frameworks  within which these zones operate.  On the other hand, if the
policy  framework  were  such  that  a  free  zone  in  Gaza  turned  out  to  be  a  success,  its
expansion to the West Bank might have to be considered.
provide preferential  access to any country.
62. Israel's Trade Regime
This  section  draws  in  part  on  the  1999  WTO  Trade  Policy  Review  for  Israel.
Between  1993  and  1999,  the  simple  average  of MFN  tariffs  fell  from  8.3%  to  7.5%
(excluding  ad valorem  equivalents  or AVEs).  They fell  in manufacturing  from 8.5%  to
7%,  but rose  in agriculture  from  5% to 20.6%. The  range of MFN tariff rates  increased
from  0-100%  to 0-250%  (from 0-40%  to 0-250% in agriculture,  and  from  0-66% to 0-
215%  in manufacturing).  The standard deviation of the  1999  MFN tariff (whose simple
average  inclusive of AVEs was 8.7%) was  15.5%,  reflecting a high degree of dispersion
(the coefficient of variation is 1.8).
New  FTA  partners  since  1993  include  Canada,  the  Czech  Republic,  Hungary,
Jordan,  Poland, the  Slovak  Republic,  Slovenia and Turkey.  This is in addition to FTAs
with  the  US,  the  EU  and  EFTA.  These  countries  have  duty-free  access,  mainly  on
industrial products. The recent FTAs go beyond trade preferences  and contain provisions
on  trade-related  aspects  such  as  competition,  state  aid,  intellectual  property  rights,
safeguards,  government procurement, and dispute settlement.  As a result of the increasing
number of FTAs, the actual  average customs duties paid halved between  1993  and 1999,
to a level of 1%,  with 75% of Israeli  manufacturing  imports  entering  under preferential
(mostly  duty-free)  rates  by  1998.  The  increase  in the  MFN  tariff rates  on  imports  of
agricultural  products  is mainly due to "tariffication,"  whereby  non-tariff measures  (such
as quantitative  restrictions)  are replaced by equivalent tariffs, typically  a first step in the
process towards  a more  liberal trade  regime.  Food,  beverage,  clothing  and footwear  get
higher protection.
Most  imports and  domestic  products  are  subject to  purchase taxes  and the VAT,
with  some  (e.g.,  tobacco  and  alcohol)  subject  to  additional  taxes.  The  purchase  tax
averages about  10% of the value of imports, or 10 times the average tariff rate. The VAT
is 17%.
Israel also took additional steps to liberalize  its trade regime.  First, the coverage of
an additional  tariff called the  "safeguard  levy"  fell from 2.7%  of tariff lines  in 1992  to
0.8% in 1999. Second,  as a result of the Uruguay Round Agreement and the more recent
7International  Technology Agreement, Israel bound its rates on just over half its tariff lines
by  1999.4  Third,  Israel  has  not been an  active user of its  anti-dumping  legislation.  No
coutervailing  or safeguard measures were taken between  1993  and  1999.5  Fourth, Israel
has  also  improved  customs  valuation  and  has  abolished  the  "harama"  system  which
increased the value of imports by 2 to  10% before tariffs were imposed.6
With respect  to  non-tariff measures  (NTMs),  8.5%  of tariff lines  were  subject  to
import licenses in 1999, and 39% of tariff lines were subject to standards.  For agriculture,
the ratios were 23.5%  and  85.8%, respectively,  while for manufacturing, they were 7.7%
and 37.1%. Thus, agriculture  has been the more protected sector,  both in terms of tariffs
and in terms of NTMs.'
2.1.  West Bank and Gaza
By virtue of belonging to a CU, tariffs and purchase  taxes on individual tariff lines
are  the  same  for  Israel  and  WBG.8 This  does  not  necessarily  imply  that  average
protection rates are the same because  the composition  of imports can differ, with one of
the two having imports  that are more skewed towards high-protection goods. This can be
due to a different composition of goods, of source countries, or both.
4 However,  these were often above the applied  MFN  rates,  which maintains  an element of uncertainty  for
investors  and importers.  This could be reduced by binding at  applied rates and by  increasing  the tariff line
coverage.
5  These  measures allow for a temporary increase in the degree of protection.
6 On  the  other hand,  seasonal  tariffs,  and  both  MFN  and  preferential  tariff quotas  (tariff quotas  provide
concessional  rates  on  imports up to  a given quantity or quota),  have been  introduced  in recent  years and
have  reduced the transparency  of the trade  regime,  as  have a wide range  of end-use  provisions  (granting
tariff reduction  for specified  end-users).  For some MFN tariff quotas,  the concessional  rate is  higher than
the applied rate and is redundant.
' Mandatory  standards  are increasingly  being  aligned  with international  standards.  Standards  and customs
valuation were  amended as part of obligations  Israel took under the Uruguay round.  In  1999,  about 25% of
the  mandatory  standards  were  equivalent  to  the  international  ones.  Israel  has  also  made  extensive
commitments under the GATT, especially  in the financial services area, providing legal security  for market
access.  It is also  a party to  the  1997  Agreement  on Telecommunications  Services  (Fourth  Protocol),  the
1997  Information  Technology  Agreement  (ITA),  and  the  1997  Agreement  on  Financial  Services  (Fifth
Protocol),  the  WTO  Trade-Related  Aspects  of  Intellectual  Property  Rights  (TRIPS)  and  the  WTO
Government  Procurement Agreement (GPA).
8 In  fact, the arrangement  between  Israel  and the WBG  is  known as  a "modified  CU"  because WBG  has
access  to a limited range of imports  from Arab League  member countries  (goods  on lists Al, A2  and B),
whose value in 1998 was $35 million or 1.1% of total WBG imports.
8For instance, the sum of the average MFN tariff rate and the purchase tax for Israel
is  about  11%  (WTO,  2000),  while  it  is  about  16.6%  for  WBG  or  about  50%  higher
(Astrup  and  Dessus,  2000).  As  is  shown  in  Section  3,  the  higher  barriers  in  WBG
associated with the different composition of imports makes the change from the CU to a
non-discriminatory trade policy (NDTP) more attractive to WBG.
3.  Customs Union with Israel
This  section  examines  the pros  and  cons of maintaining  a customs  union  (CU)
arrangement  with  Israel.  It  also  examines  ways  to  make  the  CU  more  beneficial  for
WBG.  The NDTP is used as the counterfactual  relative to which the gains  and losses of
the CU  are  measured.  I  assume  that  under the  NDTP  the  same  MFN  tariff rates  are
applied  as under the  CU,  and later  examine the possibility of trade  liberalization  under
the NDTP (Section 3.2.2).
3.1. Losses
There  are three  sources  of economic  losses  for WBG in  a CU  arrangement  with
Israel.  The  first  one  consists  of a  loss  of revenue  from  border  taxes  and  the  VAT
associated with "indirect  imports",  the  second consists of a net transfer due to both the
trade deficit with Israel  and differences  in average border taxes, and the third-which  is
harder  to quantify-relates  to  standards.  These  costs  are  first  calculated  relative  to  a
counterfactual  scenario of a NDTP by WBG vis-a-vis Israel with WBG having the  same
trade policy as Israel vis-a-vis the rest of the world (ROW), and then relative to a NDTP
with unilateral trade liberalization by WBG.
3.1.1. Tariff and Purchase Tax
Israel  charges both a tariff and a purchase  tax on imports from ROW, including on
imports that are destined for WBG. The WBG imports from the ROW that transit through
Israel  enter  in one of two ways.  They either enter as "direct imports"  to WBG,  with the
WBG  destination  of  the  goods  clearly  identified,  or  as  "indirect  imports"  whose
destination  is declared  as being  Israel,  and where the  goods are later exported  to WBG.
The  latter are typically  imported by an Israeli firm,  and then either re-exported to WBG
9(possibly  without the  knowledge  of the  original  importer)  or purchased  by Palestinians
(such as those working in Israel) and taken back to WBG.
The tariff and purchase  tax revenues  on direct imports to WBG  are transferred by
Israel  to the PA  (less  a 3%  service  charge)  through a clearance  system.  This  is not the
case for indirect imports.  Imports of WBG  are  about $3.2 billion (1998  figures).  Direct
imports from  the  ROW were  close to  $800  million  ($423  million from FTA countries,
$35  million from Arab  League members,  and  $312 million  from  others).  Imports firom
Israel  in  1998  amounted  to the  rest,  or $2.4 billion.  These  imports  include  both Israeli
products and indirect imports. The level of indirect imports is not known with any degree
of precision.  It  is  assumed  here  that  they  amounted  to  $800  million  (equal  to  direct
imports).9 This implies  that imports of Israeli  products  amounted  to $1.6 billion,  or half
the total of imports by WBG.
WBG captures  neither the  import tax  revenues nor the  purchase  tax revenues  on
indirect  imports  (though  these  taxes  are  included  in the  price  that  WBG  pays  for  its
indirect imports). The average rate of import tariff plus purchase tax on imports by WBG
is  16.6%.  Thus, the loss of tax revenue  (and welfare)  on indirect imports  from the ROW
equals $133  million (16.6% of $800 million) or 3.2% of GDP. This estimate is somewhat
lower  than  that  provided  in  EC  (1999)  where  the  loss  of tax  revenue  from  indirect
imports  is  estimated  at 4% of GDP  for  1996  and  1997,  which  would  amount  to  $160
million in 1998.10
3.1.2. Value Added Tax (VAT)
Israel  also  charges  a  VAT  of  17%  on  imports  and  domestic  sales.  For  direct
imports, revenues  from the VAT are transferred  to the Palestinian Authority  (PA). WBG
importers of products  from Israel  (either produced  in Israel or indirect imports) who pay
the Israeli  VAT can apply for reimbursement,  and if so, the VAT should not affect the
9 This figure is a "guesstimate"  provided in conversations  with World Bank economists working on WBG.
10  This result would be obtained  in this  paper if it were  assumed  that indirect  imports amounted  to $960
million  and  direct  imports  amounted  to  $640  million,  or  60%  and 40%,  respectively,  of total  foreign
imports.
10price of Israeli products  sold in WBG.  However,  it is likely that some leakage  will take
place  and not all such transactions will be reported,  either because the transactions costs
involved  are  higher  than  the  expected  refund  or  in  order  to  avoid  paying  the  VAT.
Estimating  the  importance  of this  phenomenon  is  likely  to  be  difficult.  This  type  of
leakage  is also likely to  take place under  a NDTP, though probably to  a smaller extent
because a NDTP entails  border controls.  Assuming that the degree  of leakage under the
CU is  10%  larger than under a NDTP  (10% of $2.4 billion or $240  million), the loss of
revenue  (and welfare)  for WBG would  amount to  17%  of $240 million or $41  million.
Consequently,  the  loss  for  WBG  associated  with the  CU with  Israel  amounts  to  $174
million so far.
3.1.3. Transfers
The WBG exports about  $700 million per year to Israel and imports $1.6 billion of
products produced  in Israel,  with a $900 million trade deficit.  WBG experiences  negative
transfers on its  trade in Israeli  and WBG products,  both because  of its  trade deficit  and
because  of its  higher  protection.  The reason  is as  follows.  WBG protects  its  domestic
output through trade taxes amounting to  16.6% on imports from the ROW. With the CU,
Israel exports its own output to WBG at zero tariff, and this implies  a loss of tax revenue
for WBG."  On the other hand, given Israel's average protection of 11%, WBG exports to
Israel  at a higher price  because  it does  not pay the  11% trade taxes.  This  is a gain for
WBG.'2
Note  that the  16.6%  import  tax  applied  at  the  WBG border  with  Israel  under  a
NDTP would not raise prices in WBG if homogeneity between  Israeli, WBG and ROW
goods  and services is assumed (see below). This is because  the change  from the CU to a
NDTP does not change  the level of border taxes but simply changes the location  where
the  border tax  is collected,  from  Israel's  border  with  the  ROW  to  the border  between
Israel and WBG.
" The welfare  gain  for  Israel  of not paying these taxes  is smaller than the loss  for WBG because  of the
inefficiency  due  to  the  trade  diversion  associated  with  the  CU  (some  of Israel's  exports  to  WBG  are
produced at a higher cost than the cost of importing from the rest of the world).
2  This benefit for  WBG  is somewhat  smaller than the  revenue  loss for  Israel.  This  is because part of the
WBG exports are  produced at a higher cost than the cost of importing the same  goods from the rest of the
world (i.e., they entail trade diversion).
11For two reasons  (at  least),  these  transfers  are not  simply obtained by multiplying
the level of protection by the value of imports or exports.  First, part of that trade may be
in non-tradable  goods and services,  and prices of non-tradables  are not directly affected
by  protection.'3 Second,  domestically  produced  goods  and  those  imported  from  the
partner  and  from  the  ROW may not  be perfect  substitutes,  even within  the  same tariff
line.  Under  the  assumption  of heterogeneity,  these  goods  are  imperfect  substitutes  and
their  domestic  price  does  not  change  by the  full  amount  of the  protection.  Under  the
assumption  of homogeneity,  prices  do  change  by the  full  amount  of the  protection  in
small open economies (including Israel and WBG).
Starting with services, exports to WBG of services produced  by Israel amounted to
some $492  million (out of a total  of $1.6  billion).  The  share of non-tradable  services  in
these  exports  amounted to  about  80%  or $394  million (see  Appendix  for calculations).
Thus, total  exports of Israeli goods and services to WBG that are internationally  tradable
equal  $1.206 billion  ($1.6 billion  - $394 million).  On the other hand,  WBG exports $51
million of services to Israel. Assuming the same degree of non-tradability (of 80%), some
$40  million  are not  tradable.  Moreover,  WBG  exports  stones  to  Israel.  These  are  not
traded internationally  and amount to 11.3% of total WBG exports to Israel, or about $80
million. Thus, total WBG exports to Israel of internationally  tradable  goods and services
is $580 million ($700 million - $120 million).
Given  these  figures,  and  assuming  first  homogeneity  (perfect  substitutability
between  domestically produced  goods and imports), WBG loses on its imports  of Israeli
goods and services  a total of $200  million under the CU (16.6% of $1.206 billion).  This
is because Israel can sell at the higher price in WBG due to WBG's tariffs with the ROW,
but WBG does not collect any tariff revenue on these imports.  On the other hand, it gains
$64 million (11% of $580 million). Thus, the net loss is $136 million.
13 Even if prices of non-tradable  goods and services  are indirectly affected  by protection, as  long  as there
are no distortions in the non-tradable markets, changes  in their prices or output has no welfare implications.
12Under heterogeneity,  the net loss may be smaller.  To compute that loss requires  a
general  equilibrium  framework  as  well  as  knowledge  of--or  assumptions  about--
elasticities  of substitution  in  production  and  consumption  of domestic  and  imported
products,  and this  is  beyond the  scope  of this  paper.  Such  a  framework  was  used  by
Astrup and  Dessus (2000)  to examine  the impact of policy changes  on WBG,  and their
results  fall  within  the  range  of results  found  in  this  paper.  Consequently,  the  loss  for
WBG associated with the CU with Israel is ($174 million + $136 million =) $310 million.
3.1.3. L1  Smuggling
The above assumes that the PA is able to control the border effectively and collect
all border taxes. The reality, however,  is that the border is extremely porous, particularly
between the West Bank and Israel.  Then, WBG is only likely to collect part of the border
taxes, even under a NDTP. A leakage of 20% may seem reasonable, but a leakage of 40%
is assumed here to show that a NDTP is preferable to the CU even under assumptions that
favor the CU. Thus, assuming that 40% of Israeli exports  are  smuggled  and enter WBG
undetected,  the  authorities  only  collect  60%  of potential  trade  tax  revenue,  or  $120
million  (60% of the  $200  million  obtained  in the  previous  section).  Some of the  $80
million  of  lost  trade  tax  revenue  will  be  wasted  (in  real  resources  spent  to  avoid
detection)  and  the rest  is likely  to  accrue  to  Palestinian  traders  and  customs  officials.
Assuming that half the lost revenue  is wasted and half accrues  to Palestinian traders,  the
welfare  loss for WBG  associated with the CU amounts to $160 million ($120 million of
revenue  plus $40 million accruing  to traders  and customs officers).  Given WBG's gains
of $64  million on exports  to Israel,  the net welfare  loss for WBG is $96 million.  Thus,
depending  on the degree  of leakage  and the rents  smugglers collect,  the  loss due to net
negative transfers ranges between $96 million and $136 million.
3.1.4. Sum of Losses
The sum of the WBG losses (lost revenues from tariff, purchase  tax and VAT, and
negative transfers due to the trade deficit with Israel)  ranges  from $270 million to  $310
million,  or between  6.4% and 7.3%  of the GDP of WBG.  In present value  (with a real
discount rate of, say,  6%), this loss amounts to between $4.5 billion and  $5.2 billion,  or
between  106% and  122% of GDP.
13Total  tax revenue  losses  under the CU amount to $334 million in the presence of
smuggling,  or 6.9% of GDP, and amount to $374 million in the absence of smuggling, or
8.8%  of  GDP.1 4 Thus,  replacing  the  CU  with  a  NDTP  should  enable  the  PA  to
significantly lower border or other taxes without loss of revenue,  and this should result in
additional welfare gains.
3.1.5. Transactions  Costs
One issue not examined so far is the impact of transactions  costs.  What follows is
not an  analysis  of the  impact of a reduction  in  transactions  costs per se  (on  that,  see
Astrup and Dessus, 2000). Rather, the analysis  deals with how a reduction in transactions
costs  affects  the comparison between  the CU and  a NDTP.  Calculations  are  presented
under the assumption that smuggling does not take place. Conclusions  are the same under
the assumption of smuggling.  If transactions costs  were reduced  in the final status stage,
trade  between  Israel  and  WBG would  be  larger.  The non-intifada  transactions  costs on
exports  from  WBG  to  Israel  have  been  estimated  at  35%  (Astrup  and  Dessus,  2000).
Those from Israel to WBG are smaller, and it is assumed here that they amount to  15%.
Assume that in the final status stage, transactions costs are reduced to 5%  for trade
in both directions between  Israel  and  WBG. This implies that the net price  obtained by
Israeli exporters  would be 95% rather than 85%  of the price in WBG, which amounts to
an increase of .118  (=10/85) or 11.8%. Assuming an elasticity of supply of Israeli exports
to  WBG  equal  to  one,  Israeli  exports  of internationally  tradable  goods  to  WBG  under
lower transactions  costs would be $1.348 billion rather than $1.206  billion, and the WBG
loss from the CU (of 16.6%) would be equal to $224 million rather than $200 million (or
an  increase  of $24  million).  The  net price  for Palestinian  exporters  would  be  equal  to
95%  rather than 65% of the export price,  which amounts  to  a 46.2%  increase.  With the
same supply elasticity for exports from WBG to Israel, WBG exports  would be equal to
$848  million  rather  than  $580  million,  and  the  gain  (of  11%)  would  amount  to  $93
million rather than $64 million (or $29 million more).
14 Total tax revenue losses are larger by $64 million because the positive transfer of $64 million (associated
with the fact that WBG does not pay trade taxes on its exports to Israel) accrues to exporters and not to tax
14Thus, the net loss of the  CU under lower transactions costs would be $131  million
rather than $136 million, or a difference of less than 4%. Assuming an elasticity of export
supply of two rather than one results in a net welfare  loss of the CU of $126 million. And
assuming that transactions  costs for WBG fall only to  10% rather than  to 5%  raises the
welfare  loss  from $136  million to  $140  million with  an  elasticity  of one,  and  to $144
million with an elasticity of two.  In other words, the  reduction in transactions  costs does
not have  a significant  impact on the welfare  comparison between  the  CU and a NDTP.
The reason is that the reduction in transactions  costs is larger for the WBG but the value
of Israeli exports as well as the WBG border taxes are larger,  and the two sets of effects
approximately  cancel each other out.
3.1.6. Standards
Israel  imposes various  standards  on imports  into the  CU (39% of tariff lines were
subject to standards).  These are imposed partly for the public good (such as sanitary  and
phyto-sanitary standards  in agriculture,  and technical  standards  in industry)  and partly as
a protectionist device (and the two sets of standards  typically overlap).  Both may result in
costs for WBG. The optimal level of the public-good standards is in part a function of the
income of the society that imposes them. These standards are likely to be set at levels that
are close to optimal for Israel  but may be too high for WBG (whose per capita income is
only  10%  of that  of Israel).  Second,  the  protectionist  standards  are  imposed  to protect
Israeli  industry and not for the benefit of WBG. Under a NDTP, WBG would be able to
impose  standards that suit its needs. On the other hand, there is a risk that the PA might
use standards as a tool for protection of some of its own inefficient sectors,  thereby doing
more  harm  than  good.  Consequently,  one  cannot  determine  a priori whether  WBG
standards will be better than Israeli ones.
3.2. Benefits
There are two types of benefits from a CU, one associated with avoiding the cost of
establishing  and  managing  alternative  trade  arrangements  with  Israel,  and  the  second
dealing with issues of political economy.
or customs authorities.
153.2.1. Customs Administration
With  a  CU,  WBG  avoids  the  costs  associated  with  setting  up  customs  borders
(training  personnel,  building  customs  posts,  buying  computers),  and collecting  taxes to
reflect differences  in VAT, excise  and tariff rates on third-party trade.  The operating cost
has  been reported  to amount  to  1.5%  of the  value of imports  (Daoud,  2000,  p. 21).  At
$3.2 billion of imports, this amounts to savings of $48 million.  Thus, the net loss of the
CU so far is $262 million ($3 10 million - $48 million) or 6.1% of GDP in the absence  of
smuggling,  and  $222  million  ($270  million  - $48  million)  or  5.2%  of GDP  in  the
presence of smuggling.
The $48 million is the  cost of subcontracting customs  operations to  a private firm.
Daoud (2000, p. 21) estimates the cost of five commercial  and five passenger  stations to
be about half the cost of the privatization  solution.  Whether  the former will  do the job,
given the border's  high degree  of porosity,  is an  open question.  Daoud  argues  that the
private  solution, though more  expensive,  will reduce  leakages  and the  losses of revenue
associated  with  customs  personnel's  lack  of experience  (and  possible  lack  of rigor  in
enforcing customs regulations).
Another  important  cost  that  is  being  avoided  with  the  CU  is  the  lost  income
suffered by traders due to delays at the border. This cost can be minimized under a NDTP
by  lowering  MFN  tariffs,  simplifying  the  tariff structure  and making  it more  uniform.
This would  also reduce the discretionary  power of customs authorities and would reduce
the  lobbying  and  corruption  that  complex  tariff  structures  typically  entail.  This  is
examined in Section 3.2.2 below.
3.2.2. Political Economy
A CU with Israel takes trade policy mostly out of the hands of the PA. Though this
entails  a  loss  of sovereignty  as  compared  with  an  FTA  or  a  NDTP,  it  may  generate
economic  benefits.  This depends  on three  issues:  i) the  CU's trade  policy,  ii) the trade
policy that would prevail in WBG in the absence of a CU, and iii) the resources  spent to
generate such a trade policy.
16Israel's  trade  policy  has  been  liberalized  in recent  years,  with  an average  MFN
tariff of 7%  in  1999  and an  overall  average  tariff of 1%,  and import  licenses  only  on
8.5%  of  tariff  lines.  The  CU's  external  trade  policy  could  benefit  from  further
liberalization, though it is quite liberal and has been liberalizing.  Moreover, since WBG's
net trade with Israel  is weighted  towards  agricultural  goods,  it  should benefit  from the
higher  protection  provided  to  agriculture  (for  a  given  average  protection  rate).  And
though it  is  possible  that  WBG  might have  a  better  trade  policy  under  an  alternative
arrangement,  this is by no means certain. This brings us to the second and third points.
The  PA  has  the  choice,  under  a  NDTP  with  respect  to  Israel,  either  of
implementing a  better trade policy than that of the  CU or not.  An important  question is
whether  the  PA  will  be  strong  enough,  and  whether  WBG  will  have  sufficiently-
developed  supporting  public  institutions  with  the  right  kind of incentive  structure,  in
order to make decisions for the long-term benefit of the  entire population rather than for
the short-term  benefit of particular  groups.  Institutions  in WBG  are  currently weak  and
transparency  in  public  affairs  is  limited.  And  a  number  of centers  of economic  and
political  power  are  likely to  continue  exerting  pressure  on the  government  in order  to
obtain favors through the political  system rather than through the market.  All these make
it  seem  doubtful  that  the  political  economy  equilibrium  will  result  in  a  liberal  and
transparent  trade policy.  Thus,  the outcome  under  a  NDTP  may very  well  be  a  more
restrictive and distorted trade policy than the one under a CU with Israel.  15 16
Moreover,  such  a trade  policy  is  likely  to  be  the  (equilibrium)  outcome  of the
investment of real resources  in the lobbying effort of different groups  in order to  obtain
the type of protection  that favors  them.  Thus,  not only is there  a danger that the  trade
policy itself will be harmful to the economy of WBG, but the process of reaching such  a
policy may also result in a significant waste of scarce resources.
Is Any policy makers-whether the PA or others--face pressures from interest groups. The point, however,
is that the PA is weak and its functioning  is not transparent or subject to control by elected representatives,
and policy outcomes will not necessarily  satisfy the public good.
16  Israel allows WBG to import limited quantities of certain goods from Arab countries that are on lists Al
and A2.  EC (1999) reports that monopolies have been created in WBG, partly in response to these quotas.
Such an outcome  is by no means inevitable  as the quotas could be auctioned  in a competitive environment.
17The discipline  imposed  on the trade policy of WBG that results  from  a CU  with
Israel may well be the major benefit of maintaining the present trade  arrangement.  Take
for  instance  the  case  of Botswana,  a  member of the  Southern  African  Customs  Union
(SACU),  which  has been  the  fastest  growing  country  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa  in recent
years. Botswana's trade policy is determined by South Africa. And though South Africa's
past protectionist trade policy was  much worse than the one presently pursued by Israel,
the arrangement  led to rapid growth in Botswana by taking trade policy out of the hands
of its government and interest groups, and  allowing  all energies  to concentrate  on using
market activities rather than the political system to generate income.
3.3. Conclusion on CU
The analysis has  shown that a NDTP with the  same structure  of trade  taxes as the
CU  is superior to the CU.  Whether the PA has total control of its border or not, the loss
from the CU relative to a NDTP is important. That loss would be significantly reduced if
revenues  from border taxes were shared more equitably under an alternative  system (such
as on a macroeconomic  basis a la SACU).
In fact, welfare under  a NDTP  could be raised further by unilaterally lowering the
level  of trade  taxes  and rationalizing  them.  For  a  (very)  small  open  economy  such  as
WBG, lowering MFN tariffs would unambiguously improve efficiency and raise welfare.
However,  moving to a NDTP runs the risk that the trade regime  resulting from political
economy forces could be highly protectionist.'7 Thus,  a "conditional  NDTP" where trade
policies  are  constrained  to  be  liberal  is  likely  to  be  superior  to  a  CU,  though  a
protectionist NDTP may well be worse.
If the present overall CU framework  is maintained,  it will require  several  changes.
First,  as  was  noted  above,  WBG  experiences  losses  both  in  terms  of tax  revenue  on
imports  from the ROW  and  from  transfers  due to its  trade  deficit  with  Israel.  On  tax
revenue,  one  option  is to improve  the implementation  of a notional border,  with better
18labeling  and  other  means  of identifying  the  goods  whose  final  destination  is  WBG.
However, given the porosity of the border described earlier (including daily movement of
Palestinian  workers),  a  preferable  option  may  be  the  sharing  of import  taxes  on  a
macroeconomic  basis. This is the system used by SACU.  South Africa collects all border
taxes  and  shares them  with the  other members  of SACU (Botswana,  Lesotho,  Namibia
and Swaziland).  The share of border taxes  given to  South Africa's partners  corresponds
to each  partner's  share  in SACU's GDP,  multiplied  by  a coefficient  larger than one  in
order  to  compensate  them  for the  fact that  SACU's trade  policy  corresponds  to  South
Africa's priorities rather than to theirs.
Second,  WBG  experiences  a real  income  loss  due to  its  trade  deficit with  Israel
(and higher  average tariff).  One solution  is for Israel to reimburse  WBG for an estimate
of the  losses.  This type  of arrangement  has  occurred  in  CUs  where  the distribution  of
gains  and losses was deemed to be asymmetric  and threatened the survival of the CU.  In
fact,  CUs  in Africa,  Latin  America  and  Asia  collapsed  in the  past  because  a  favored
member refused to renegotiate the distribution of gains  and losses.1 8 Another alternative
would  be  for  Israel  to  lower  its  purchase  tax.  This  would  also  help  with  the  loss
associated with the tax revenue problem.'9
"7  The  evidence  from other newly  independent states  is not very reassuring  with respect  to the  quality of
governance.  This  is true of most developing countries  that became  independent  following  de-colonization
as well as for many of the republics of the former Soviet Union.
ls  For  instance,  this  occurred  in  the  1960s  with  the  EAC  (East  African  Community)  which  fell  apart
because  Tanzania  and  Uganda  were  dissatisfied  with  the  transfers  accruing  to  Kenya;  and  the  same
occurred  in the  1960s when Honduras  left the  CACM (Central  American  Common Market)  in reaction to
El Salvador's refusal to renegotiate  the distribution of tariff revenues.  This problem was also a factor in the
war in the  1970s  between  East Pakistan (now  Bangladesh)  and West Pakistan  (now Pakistan),  and  in the
US Civil War between the North and the South (World Bank, 2000).
19  WBG  uses the  Israeli currency  (NIS) for most of its transactions,  though  not as a reserve  currency.  If
WBG  had a CU with Israel that included a better distribution of revenues  from trade taxes,  its relationship
to Israel would resemble  the one that existed between Luxembourg and Belgium. These two countries were
members of a monetary union with Belgium having a monopoly on monetary policy (still true until January
1, 2002),  and  they  were  members  of a  customs  union  (with the Netherlands).  Another similarity  is that
Luxembourg  is  landlocked  and part of its  imports came  through the  ports of Antwerp  and  Rotterdam,  so
that  the  reimbursement  of trade  taxes  was  also  an  issue.  The  arrangement  seems  to  have  worked  for
Luxembourg.  Of course,  Luxembourg  has  the advantage  of having  large,  rich and open  neighbors,  which,
as  Vamvakidis  (1998)  has  shown, has  a strong  impact on  a  country's growth,  and it has benefited  from
serving as a tax haven.
19One final issue is that if WBG remains in a CU with Israel, it is likely to have little
or no say with respect to its evolution.  This is of course unattractive  from the viewpoint
of political sovereignty.  However,  since Israel has pursued a process of liberalization  in
recent  years  and  is  likely  to  continue  to  do  so,  the  economic  implications  of Israeli
control  of the trade  policy of WBG need  not be  adverse.  Kessler  (Ch.  5,  p.  45,  in  EC
Report,  1999)  argues that  Israeli  protection probably  meets  Palestinian needs  relatively
well, with most imports from EU, US and EFTA entering duty free, and low MFN tariffs
on inputs, raw materials and investment goods, and higher tariffs and NTMs on consumer
goods.  On the other hand, it is less  likely that Israel's standards  are favorable  to WBG.
And the CU also imposes a cost on WBG by limiting its trade with members of the Arab
League.
The CU option may entail an additional  cost. Section  5.3  recomnmends that the PA
require a fee-based  permit to work in Israel. This can only be effective if the PA controls
its border with Israel.  Control of labor flows across the border will be harder under a CU
than under a NDTP.
4. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Israel
The  FTA  option is  first compared  to a NDTP  and then  to the  CU  (Section  4.4).
Under  a FTA,  WBG would establish border  controls,  and taxes on its  imports  from the
ROW would be collected by the PA rather than by Israeli authorities.
4.1. Benefits
A  NDTP  was  shown  in  Section  3 to  be  superior  to  the  CU  (assuming  WBG's
freedom  under  a  NDTP  to  set  its  own  trade  policy  does  not  result  in  closing  the
economy).  A NDTP  is also  superior to  an FTA  for  two reasons  at least.  First,  the  net
negative transfer ranging  between $96 million and $136 million under the CU, and which
is associated with WBG's trade deficit with Israel, remains under an FTA but not under a
NTDP.  Second,  a NTDP  does not require  rules  of origin  (and  neither does  a CU),  and
these can be very costly for the authorities  as well as for traders and for the economy  as a
whole.
204.2. Rules of Origin (ROO)
Replacing  the  WBG-Israel  CU with  an  FTA  requires  WBG  to  establish  border
controls. These controls  entail a number of significant  costs, including the establishment
and operation of a customs administration.  These costs are also incurred under a NDTP.
However,  one  of the  customs  administration  principal  activities  under  an  FTA  is  the
control of the  origin  of goods  exported  by Israel  to WBG.  This is required  in order  to
avoid the problem of "trade deflection."  Under an FTA, WBG might have higher tariffs
than Israel  on a variety of products.  These  products  could  then  be imported  by  Israeli
firms, paying the lower Israeli  tariff,  and sold  duty-free  in the WBG.  This is known  as
"trade deflection."
Trade deflection  has the following  consequences.  First, WBG  would  lose control
over its  external trade  policy.  Products  would not pay the  higher WBG  tariff but rather
the lower Israeli tariff. Thus, the effective tariff on goods imported by WBG would be the
lower  Israeli  tariff.  But  WBG  would  not  even  collect  the revenue  associated  with that
lower tariff because the firms importing the goods would be paying the lower tariff to the
Israeli  customs  authorities.  In other  words,  WBG would then be better off adopting the
lower  Israeli  tariff because  this  would eliminate  any incentive  for  trade  deflection  and
WBG would at least collect the tariff revenue associated with the lower tariff.
In  order  to  avoid  the  consequences  of  trade  deflection,  the  WBG  customs
administration  needs to control  the origin of goods that  it imports  from Israel.  Ideally,
duty-free  trade between WBG and  Israel should apply to goods that are produced within
the FTA bloc (WBG and Israel), and should not apply to goods imported from outside the
FTA bloc. This  may  seem  simple  in theory,  but the reality of controlling  the  origin  of
goods is complicated.  Goods exported by Israel to  WBG are likely to incorporate  inputs
imported  from  outside  the  FTA bloc.  In that  case,  only  the value  added  (VA)  can be
considered  as  having  been  produced  inside  the  bloc.  The  question  arises  then  as  to
whether these goods should be considered as having been produced  inside the bloc or not.
If they are, they enter WBG duty-free. If not, they must pay the tariff imposed by WBG.
21Ideally,  an FTA should entail the free  movement of value added produced  inside
the bloc. However, trade takes place in final goods and not in value added. Consequently,
rules of origin (ROO) have been devised in order to (imperfectly)  control for the origin of
goods. The most common rule uses the share of value added as a criterion,  in which case
the parties  agree  that in order  for a country to obtain  preferential  access to  its partner's
market  for a given  product,  the  value  added produced  inside  the bloc must  be above  a
certain percentage of the value of the product.20
The  attempt  to  solve  the problem  of trade  deflection  through  ROO  results  in  a
number of new problems.  The paper  focuses  on five of them.2'  First, ROO  can  lead to
additional trade diversion and a welfare loss. For instance,  assume that WBG can import
inputs either  from Israel  or from the rest of the  world (ROW),  but that if it uses  inputs
from the ROW,  it will  not comply with the ROO  and will not receive trade  preferences
on its exports to Israel (i.e.,  it will have to pay the tariff).  The cost of the inputs from the
ROW  is  50  while  the  cost of the  same  inputs  from  Israel  is  60  (say,  because  of 20%
protection  on them).  Assume  that  the tariff Israel  charges  on imports of the  final  good
from the ROW is 20.  Then,  it is advantageous  for WBG to buy the  expensive  inputs in
Israel  because,  even  though  the  inputs  cost  10  more,  WBG  avoids  paying  20  on its
exports to Israel.  Thus, ROO generate  additional trade diversion:  the ROO has resulted in
an inefficiency  loss of 10 since WBG was forced to buy more expensive  inputs  in order
to  benefit  from  its  duty-free  access  to  Israel's  market.  Thus,  ROO  can  result  in
misallocation of resources  (in this  case in Israel, which is producing inputs inefficiently)
and a transfer (of 10) from WBG to Israel.
Second,  for  small  countries  such  as  WBG,  complying  with ROO  is  likely to  be
harder  than  for  Israel.  WBG  is  a  much  smaller  economy,  with  an  annual  per  capita
income equal  to 10% of that of Israel (about $1,700 versus  $17,000)  and a GNP equal to
some  5%  of that  of Israel.  WBG  is  thus  significantly  more  dependent  than  Israel  on
20  Under other ROO,  a good will be considered  to be  produced inside the  bloc if i) it entails a substantial
transformation  of the inputs  from outside the bloc, where the criterion typically is that the tariff line of the
product  differs  from  that of the  inputs  (say,  steel versus  automobiles),  or  ii)  an essential  component  is
produced inside the bloc (say, the motherboard for computers).
Most of these problems are examined in Krueger (1997).
22imported inputs and components  needed for production.  It is therefore  likely to be much
harder for WBG than for Israel to comply with ROO requirements.  This implies that for a
number of products,  either WBG will have to pay the Israeli MFN tariff on its exports to
Israel  or it will have to buy more expensive Israeli inputs.
Third, ROO  are typically  quite complex and enforcing them can be very costly for
the authorities but even more so for exporters.  The book that describes NAFTA's  ROO is
200 pages long.  Enforcing such complex  rules entails a variety of additional  costs, over
and above  the  standard costs  of customs  administration  in the  case  where  MFN  tariffs
apply to all countries.
Proving origin (including obtaining all the necessary documents)  can be very costly
for exporters as well. These costs have been estimated by Herin (1986) at 3 to 5% of the
f.o.b.  price for EFTA countries.  In WBG, a poorer region with less experience in customs
administration,  costs of border  delays  are  likely  to be  larger  than in  EFTA  countries.
Given  WBG's FTAs with  Israel, the EU and the US,  imports  from FTA  regions would
amount  to about  $2.8 billion.  With compliance  costs for  exporters  estimated  at three  to
five  percent of imports,  the cost would be equal  to $84  to $140  million. Astrup-Dessus
(2001)  estimate the loss due to ROO at 2.8% of welfare (i.e., of GDP of $4.25 billion) or
$140 million. Including this cost reduces the net benefit of the FTA to something close to
zero.
Fourth,  ROO  can  be,  and  in fact always  are,  used  as protectionist  devices.  This
further restricts  the free movement of goods between partners.  Thus,  producers in WBG
might insist on restrictive ROO to prevent competition from cheaper Israeli imports.  This
is what  occurred  in NAFTA  with textiles.  In order to  protect  its  textile  industry  from
Mexican  imports, the US insisted in the negotiations  on the  "triple transformation  test."
This ROO requires that the yarn, the cloth and the garments all have to be fully produced
within NAFTA in order for Mexican exports to be conferred NAFTA origin and enter the
US  duty-free.  Thus,  Mexican producers  must  buy all  their inputs from  inside NAFTA,
even  if these  are  more  expensive  than  inputs  produced  elsewhere,  in order  to  obtain
NAFTA preferences.  And this is not the only case  in NAFTA  where ROO were used for
23protectionist  purposes.  Restrictive  ROO  will reduce  the  degree of competition  in WBG
and will reduce the duty-free access of WBG exports to Israel.
Fifth, Israel has an FTA with Jordan and WBG is also likely to consider having one
in the final status  stage.  Moreover,  WBG has FTAs  with the  US  and the EU  (and with
Turkey because  it has a CU with the EU),  and may have more  FTAs in the final  status
stage  (following  Israel's  example  which  has  FTAs  with  various  Central  and  Eastern
European countries).  An independent trade policy implies establishing  ROO for each and
every  one  of the FTAs.  This  is likely to  result in  a "spaghetti  bowl"  (which originally
referred  to overlapping  FTAs  in Latin  America).  These overlapping  FTAs  are  likely to
greatly complicate  the administration  of ROO for WBG and to greatly increase their cost.
An FTA with Israel  will further complicate the management of ROO.
The  various  points  enumerated  above  indicate  that  ROO  can  be  very  costly,
especially for a small  economy like  WBG that needs foreign markets to grow.  From that
viewpoint  alone, an FTA with Israel is less desirable than a NDTP. If one  only includes
the  cost to  exporters  of establishing  the  origin  of their  goods,  which  range  from  $84
million to $140 million, and the negative transfers, which range from $96 million to $136
million,  the benefit  of a NDTP  relative  to  an  FTA  ranges  from  $180  million  to  $276
million,  or from 4.2%  to  6.5% of GDP. And this  does not include the  other FTA costs
associated with ROO (denoted  by the letter "x" in Table  l).
4.3. FTA with Jordan
What about an FTA between  WBG and Jordan?  Such an FTA will require rules of
origin,  and  the  costs  associated  with  those  are  large,  as  examined  in  Section  4.2.
Moreover,  Jordan  has been  liberalizing  its  economy,  so  that WBG  is  unlikely  to  gain
more  from  any  preferential  access  to  Jordan  than it will  lose from  giving preferential
access to Jordan in its own market.
4.4. FTA with Israel versus CU
The analysis so far has shown that a liberal NDTP is superior to the CU and to  an
FTA.  What  about  the  comparison  between  an  FTA and  the  CU?  Border taxes  and the
24VAT  on  indirect  imports  will  be  collected  under  an  FTA  but  not  under  the  CU,
amounting  to a  gain of $174  million for the former.  On the  other hand,  an FTA  will
require  border controls  and customs administration,  whose operating  cost (not including
any setup  cost) has  been estimated  at $48 million.  An FTA will  also require  ROO.  The
cost to  exporters  of establishing origin  has been  estimated  at  between  $84  million and
$140  million. Thus, the net gain of an FTA relative to  a CU ranges from $42 million to
negative  $14 million, which averages  to $14 million or some 0.3% of GDP.
However,  this does not include other important  costs  associated  with ROO.  These
include  the  trade  diversion  and  welfare  loss  typically  associated  with ROO-a  major
problem for a very small economy like WBG that needs to obtain many of its inputs from
the  ROW, the  tendency  of the ROO  to become  a protectionist  device-with  additional
welfare  losses,  and  the  cost  of administering  the  ROO.  Thus,  the  CU  with  Israel  is
preferable to an FTA, once all the costs associated with the FTA are taken into account.
4.5. Conclusion on NDTP. FTA or CU
The  analysis leads to the following trade policy recommendation:
The  PA  should pursue a non-discriminatory trade policy  (NDTP)  with  all its
neighbors, but only under the condition of an open and transparent  trade  policy enforced
by credible lock-in mechanisms. Otherwise, a CU with Israel  is likely to be preferable.
5. Exports of Labor Services
There are two markets for WBG unskilled labor, the domestic market in WBG and
the labor market in Israel.  There are essentially two sources of unskilled  labor in Israel's
market,  Palestinian and  foreign  (e.g.,  Romanian,  Thai,  and other).  The  main if not only
source  of unskilled  labor  in  WBG  is Palestinian.  However,  low-wage  Jordanian  labor
might be attracted to work in WBG in the  final status stage, given that access  to Israel's
labor  market  has  raised  WBG  wages.  On  the  other  hand,  a  high  rate  of  WBG
unemployment  would  have  the  opposite  effect.  In  the  analysis  that  follows,  we  first
abstract from Jordanian labor access to the WBG labor market.
255.1. Benefits
WBG would  greatly  benefit  from a  steady  and  stable  export of labor services  to
Israel. Ruppert (2001) finds that, after controlling  for individual factors, Palestinians earn
91%  more  in  Israel  than  in  WBG.  Thus,  the  wage  premium  earned  in  Israel's  labor
market  is  a very  important  source  of additional  income  for  WBG workers.  Net factor
income  from  Palestinian  employment  in  Israel  has  been  estimated  at  $828  million
(Ruppert,  2001).  This  means  that  Palestinian  labor  would  have  earned  $433  million
working in WBG,  and earned $395 million (or 91%) more by working in Israel, or over
9% of GDP. Even if the wage premium  were only 40%,  the  gain from exports of labor
services would be $237 million, or close to 6% of GDP. Hence, it is paramount  for WBG
to maintain access to Israel's labor market, irrespective of the trade policy between  Israel
and WBG.  22
Borders  are  closed  at  times,  and  even  when  they  are  not,  painstaking  border
controls can greatly increase the cost of working  in Israel or decrease  the probability of
being hired on a given day. It is assumed here that these issues will be mostly resolved in
the  final  status  stage  and will  no  longer  act  as  a constraint.  However,  if they  are not
resolved,  the  benefit  of access to  Israel's  labor  market  must  be  reassessed.  It is  also
assumed  that  arrangements  will  be  made  so  that  some  of the  taxes  Israel  collects  on
Palestinian labor (e.g., deductions for pensions) will be transferred to the PA or to private
accounts,  and that the issue of differential income  taxation favoring foreign workers will
be resolved.
5.2. Losses
Palestinians only have access  to unskilled jobs in Israel, even though some of the
Palestinians working in Israel are skilled (and prefer to work for high unskilled wages in
Israel rather than for lower skilled wages in WBG). This has several consequences.  First,
22 This is  mentioned because it is unclear what Israel's reaction, if any, would be to a decision by the PA to
implement  a non-discriminatory  trade policy whereby Israel would be  denied  preferential access to WBG
markets.
26the  skills  of skilled  Palestinians  working  in  Israel  are  likely  to  depreciate.  Second,
assuming  there  are  positive  externalities  whereby  skilled  workers  typically  raise  the
productivity  of unskilled  ones  by  interacting  with  them  in  the production  process  (as
assumed  in  some  of  the  "endogenous  growth"  theory,  e.g.,  Lucas  1988),  then  the
productivity of unskilled labor in WBG is lower than if all skilled Palestinians worked in
WBG.  Third,  given the  higher  unskilled  wages  for Palestinians  due  to  their  access  to
Israel's labor market, the return to skills is now lower in WBG, with a negative effect on
the incentive for Palestinians to acquire education and skills.
Second,  and  probably  more  important,  Palestinians  working  in  Israel  create  a
"Dutch-disease"  type phenomenon in the economy of WBG.  Ruppert (2001) reports that
in 1999 ". ..  nearly 23% of employed Palestinians held jobs in Israel or Israeli settlements
(averaging  126,000  out of a total employment  level  of 555,000)."  This results  in fewer
workers in WBG and in  higher wages  there.23 The high wage  rate  in WBG lowers  the
international  competitiveness  of the Palestinian economy, with a negative  impact on the
production of all tradable (exportable and import-competing)  goods and services.
The negative effect on the competitiveness  of tradable  sectors  is not considered to
be  a  problem  as  long  as the  income  from  exports  of labor  services  is permanent  and
reasonably  stable. If it  is,  then the  result  is simply an  adjustment  by the economy  to a
change in its comparative  advantage, with the new source of income financing  additional
imports, and with other now less competitive  tradable sectors shrinking.  This would seem
to be the case for WBG in the final  status stage as long as Israel continues to prosper and
does not experience  a massive economic  decline, and if security problems are resolved.
The Dutch disease  would in fact be a disease  if the source of income were viewed
as  permanent but were  in fact  temporary  (as occurred  in the  1960s  in the Netherlands
with natural gas, and in the  1980s in Nigeria and Mexico with oil) because it would result
23  Ruppert (2001)  shows the relation  between unskilled wages  in Israel  and WBG, with the WBG  wage a
function of the Israeli wage, the probability of getting a job, and the cost of transport,  border controls etc.
27in  excessive  foreign  borrowing  and  spending.24 The  problem  also  arises  because  the
reallocation of resources associated with the Dutch disease is likely to be irreversible due
to high adjustment costs, resulting in permanent losses.
But even if the new source of income were  permanent,  it might result  in dynamic
costs. If manufacturing  in WBG entails  learning-by-doing  or entails positive externalities
at the  industry  level  whereby  firms benefit  from  other  firms'  presence  and production
(benefits which are typically not internalized by individual firms), access to Israel's labor
market would reduce manufacturing  output and  generate dynamic  losses.25 Also, a larger
manufacturing  sector  can  support  a  larger  number  of firms  providing  manufacturing
services,  thus  lowering  the  cost  of these  services  (especially  non-tradable  ones)  and
raising the  level  of competitiveness.  These  "economic  geography"  or "agglomeration"
benefits are potentially quite  important.  Thus, by raising WBG wages, access  to Israel's
labor market may result in permanent productivity losses for WBG manufacturing  firns.
Thus,  stable  and  permnanent  access  to  Israel's  labor  market  is  on  the  whole
economically  beneficial  for WBG,  though  it is likely  to  entail  some  negative  dynamic
effects  by reducing the level of productivity.  How can this be  dealt with in an efficient
manner?
5.3.  Palestinian Permit
One  way  to  reduce  the  effect  of access  to  the Israeli  labor market  on wages  and
competitiveness  is for the PA to institute a system of fee-based permits for labor working
in  Israel.  This  arrangement  will  have  various  effects,  four  of which  are  likely  to  be
beneficial  and one which  is likely to be  ambiguous.  First, the  arrangement will provide
the PA with  an important source of additional  revenue,  enabling  it to lower taxes (e.g.,
tariffs  and the VAT).  Second,  since the net wage  rate obtained by working in Israel will
be  reduced  by the  work permit  fee,  it will reduce  the incentive to  work in Israel.  More
24 Theory and evidence have shown that consumption responds essentially to changes in  permnanent income,
not to changes in  transitory income that go essentially into savings.  The Dutch disease is  essentially caused
by a "permanent income" reaction to a  transitory income increase.
25 Note that savings in  situations of Dutch disease are typically  invested in less or non-productive  activities,
including residential construction.
28labor will remain in WBG and this will lower the wage rate there. This will help improve
the international competitiveness  of industry in WBG.
Third,  one might be tempted to  argue that if it is beneficial  to work in Israel  and
obtain  higher wages,  restricting  access  to Israel's labor  market through the  sale of fee-
based  permits  should  be  harmful.  But  this  is  not  necessarily  true.  Palestinian  workers
seem to have  a  certain degree  of market power  in the unskilled  labor market  of Israel.
Foreign workers  from Eastern Europe and South-East Asia do compete with Palestinians
in  the  Israeli  unskilled  labor  market.  If the  supply  of foreign  workers  were  infinitely
elastic  (at the wage  rate they obtain at home  plus both the  cost of coming to Israel and
living there rather than at home), than Palestinian workers  would have no market power.
However,  Palestinian and foreign workers are not perfect substitutes.
For one, many  Palestinians know  some  Hebrew,  typically  have  more experience,
and know more about the Israeli labor market than foreign workers do. Farsakh (1999, p.
19) finds that  Palestinian  and  overseas  workers are  not perfect  substitutes because  their
expertise  differs,  they  work  in  different  parts  of Israel,  and  Palestinians  are  more
experienced.  Amir  (1999)  provides  a  detailed  description  of the  differences  between
Palestinian  and  foreign  labor.  Second,  the  Israeli  government  restricts  the  inflow  of
foreign  labor--though not  always  very  effectively--so  that their  supply  is  not infinitely
elastic.
Thus, WBG labor does seem to have market power in the Israeli labor market.  This
would imply an optimal export tax on labor services, whereby the PA would impose a tax
on labor working in Israel. This would result in fewer Palestinians going to work in Israel
and in higher unskilled wages there. Thus, assuming that WBG labor has market power in
Israel's unskilled labor market,  WBG authorities are able to shift part of the tax to Israeli
employers.  Such an export tax can be implemented  with a system of fee-based permits to
work in Israel. If the fee is equivalent to the optimal export tax, then welfare of the WBG
will be  higher than in the  absence of these  permits.  Even if WBG labor has little or no
market power in the Israeli labor market, a fee-based  permit system is likely to generate
29dynamic  gains  because  WBG  is  likely  to benefit  from  increased  competitiveness  and
dynamic externalities.
Fourth,  even  though the  Israeli  and WBG  governments  may fully cooperate  in  a
final status stage, there may still be security threats from groups or individuals.  The WBG
authorities  could use the requirement  of a permit to work in Israel as a screening  device.
This would help the Israeli border police deal with security controls and would reduce the
transaction costs of crossing into Israel.
Four sources of benefits, associated  with the WBG policy of requiring a  fee-based
permit to work in Israel,  have been  identified.  On the  other hand,  the outcome  for the
Palestinian  workers  is  ambiguous.  They  experience  a  direct  loss  from  earning  a lower
wage in WBG (and also in Israel after paying for the permit). However, they are likely to
experience  an indirect benefit.  Given the added tax revenue,  workers could benefit either
from  lower  taxes  or  from  better  and/or  more  services,  especially  if the  services  are
targeted  towards them.  Since  welfare  of WBG as a whole would  presumably  be higher
with the fee-based permits  (as long as the fee  is close to the optimal  tax), workers could
be fully compensated  without  anyone  else in WBG  losing.  The  losers  from this policy
would  be  the  Israeli  employers  who  would  now  have  to pay  a higher  wage  rate  to  a
smaller number of Palestinian workers.  Whether workers win or lose very much depends
on the quality of governance  in WBG.  The assumption made  so far is that one dollar (or
NIS  or JD)  in private  hands  is equivalent  to one  dollar in the hands of the  authorities.
This assumption may be reasonable for some countries, though not necessarily for others
where the public sector is either ineffective or captive of private interest groups or both.
To  provide  some order of magnitude,  and as stated  before, total net factor income
from  Palestinian  employment  in  Israel  amounts  to  $828  million,  and  Ruppert  (2001)
estimates Palestinian wage rates in Israel to be 91% higher than in WBG. In other words,
Palestinians  receive  a 91%  premium  from working  in Israel  (and  would have  earned  a
total of $434 million working  in WBG). Hence,  charging a 10% fee (relative  to the wage
rate in WBG) would not be unreasonable and would amount to $43 million. In fact, lower
transactions  costs  in  the  final  status  stage  might  result  in  an  increased  supply  of
30Palestinian labor  willing  to  work in  Israel  and  thus in  a larger  revenue  from  the  fee,
especially if the reduction in transactions costs is larger than the fee.
Ruppert  (2001) has estimated these transactions  cost and  finds that they  are about
37%  of daily  income.  Since  the  wage  rate  in  Israel  is  91%  higher  than  in  WBG,
transactions  costs  are  70%  of  the  WBG  wage  rate  (37%  of  191%).  Assume  that
transactions  costs  on Palestinian labor fall by  50 percentage  points to 20%  of the WBG
wage rate in the final  status stage,  and that the fee charged is equal to  50% of the WBG
wage  rate (or 26%  of the Israeli  wage  rate).  Then, the  net benefit of working  in Israel
would  be  unchanged,  and  there  would  be  no  impact  on  the  supply  or  wage  rate  of
Palestinian labor working in Israel. And the revenues  from the permit fee would amount
to $217 million, or over 5% of GDP.
One problem is the porosity of the border between Israel and the West Bank. Israeli
employers  prefer to hire workers who  have no Israeli  permit  because they  are  cheaper.
Thus,  in  order  for  the  Palestinian  permit  system  to  work,  the border  will  have  to  be
carefully  monitored  for  labor  movements,  and this  will  require  border  controls.  These
would be available under an FTA or a NDTP policy but not under a CU. Thus, assuming
a system of fee-based permits were put into place, the existence of border controls would
be an additional reason for which a NDTP would be preferable to a CU.
However,  even with a NDTP, it is likely that there will be some leakage,  with part
of the  Palestinian  labor  force  working  in Israel  trying to  avoid  paying  the fee.  When
determining  the  level  of the  fee,  the  PA  should  take  into  account  that the  degree  of
leakage may rise with the level of the fee.  Such a situation would imply a lower optimal
fee.
5.4. Jordanian labor
What about Jordanian labor?  In the final status stage, and given the higher wages in
the West Bank than in Jordan, there is no reason to believe that workers from Jordan will
not  want to  work  there.  The  PA should  allow this  development  to take  place because
WBG  as a whole  will  gain.  Jordan and Israel  will also  benefit as  a whole. Jordan  will
31gain from exporting labor services to the West Bank at higher wages (which is equivalent
to an improvement in Jordan's terms of trade). Jordanian labor will benefit from access to
higher wages,  Jordanian workers in Jordan will equally benefit,  and employers in Jordan
will lose.  The  West  Bank  will benefit  from  importing  cheaper  labor  services  (also  an
improvement  in its terms of trade),  and  from the  fact that lower  wages  will raise  the
competitiveness of its industry.26 Palestinian labor in WBG will lose.
The  lower wage  rates  in the  West Bank  will  raise  the supply  of labor  willing to
work in Israel.  This will provide  WBG authorities  with an increase  in revenue  from the
fee  charged  on permits to work  in  Israel  and will dampen  the  decline  in wage  rates  in
WBG.  And  despite the  fact that the  increase  in the number  of Palestinians  working  in
Israel  lowers  the  wage  rate  they can  earn  there  and  hurts  Palestinian  workers  already
employed  in Israel,  it can  be  shown  that WBG will  increase  its gain  from Palestinians
working in Israel  as long as the optimal fee on work permits  is charged by the PA. Israel
as a whole  will benefit from cheaper imports of Palestinian labor services (terms of trade
gain), though Israeli and foreign unskilled labor will lose.
An important question in this context is whether the West Bank will allow entry by
Jordanian workers.  When Israel  created a "safe passage"  in late  1999  between Gaza and
the  West Bank,  workers  from  Gaza  went to  work  in the West  Bank  where wages  are
much higher. This resulted  in demonstrations  by West Bank workers who were unwilling
to be accept  competition from workers from  Gaza. The same might occur with Jordanian
labor, though the degree to which  WBG will open its labor market to Jordanian  workers
will also  depend  on the unemployment  rate  in the  West  Bank.  Moreover,  a number  of
Jordanian Palestinians  are originally from the  West Bank and may decide to return once
the final status stage is reached.
5.5. Conclusion on Labor Services
The analysis leads to the following labor market policy recommendation:
26 For this to be a  benefit, one must assume some  form of positive externalities, such as productivity effects
that are external to  the firm but internal to the industry or to the industrial  sector  as a whole  (e.g.,  if firm
productivity depends positively on industry output or agglomeration  externalities).
32The  PA should establish a system  of  fee-based permits for Palestinian  workers
working in Israel, and it should consider allowing access by Jordanian  workers to the
WBG labor  market.
6. Currency
The  issue  of  currency  choice  is  only  briefly  examined  here.  A  more  detailed
analysis  is found  in Kleiman (1999),  though  the proposals  considered  differ  somewhat.
Currency  is one of the  basic  symbols of national  sovereignty.  It can  provide  economic
benefits  but it carries important risks.  One risk is that  a government would make use of
the  printing press  to  finance  fiscal  deficits caused by pressures  for  additional  spending
from a variety of interest groups, thus resulting in inflation.
The WBG uses the NIS  for most  transactions.  The  seigniorage  on that accrues to
Israel. This is a loss for WBG which has been estimated by  EC (1999)  at $50 million or
1%  of GNP (calculated  at the interest rate on Israeli  government bonds).  One possibility
is for Israel to compensate  WBG for this loss.  On the other hand, as argued by Depres et
al. (1966) for the US dollar, Israel could argue that WBG benefits from Israel's monetary
policy and the stability of the NIS and that this facilitates domestic transactions  as well as
trade and other transactions with Israel,  its main trading partner.
On the other hand,  and for obvious  reasons,  it is likely to be politically  unfeasible
to  use  the NIS  in  WBG  in  the  long  run.  An alternative  is  to  replace  it  with  a major
currency,  such  as  the  US  dollar,  which  is  already  used  by  Palestinians  as  a  reserve
currency.  Precedents  of countries  that  have  adopted  the  US  dollar  as  their  currency
include  Ecuador  and  El  Salvador,  and  Argentina  has  established  a  Currency  Board
whereby its currency is fixed to the US dollar on a one-to-one basis and it cannot resort to
the  inflation  tax.  Another  alternative  is  the  euro.  The  euro  will  replace  most  EU
currencies  on January  1, 2002.  If it performs  satisfactorily  (with respect  to  the  dollar),
and given that the EU is the largest trading partner  of WBG after Israel,  the euro might
have to be considered as another alternative.
33An intermediate solution (between the choice of NIS and a major currency),  though
possibly not altogether satisfactory to the Palestinians, is to use the NIS but with different
symbols on the notes. This solution has been applied by the United Kingdom in the case
of Scotland  where  the  British  Pound  circulates  but  with  Scottish  rather  than  English
symbols.27
7. Concluding Comments
This paper has examined  various options regarding  the trade policy of WBG in the
final status  stage  and policies  related  to the WBG export  of labor  services to  Israel.  It
concludes  that a non-discriminatory  trade  policy  is likely to  be  superior  to  a  CU  with
Israel, and the CU is likely to be superior to an FTA with Israel. But there is an important
caveat.  Replacing  the  CU with a non-discriminatory  trade  policy must  entail  an open,
liberal trade regime with low, uniform tariffs bound at the WTO at the applied rates, and
the  implementation  of a  credible  mechanism  to  constrain  the  use  of protectionist  non-
tariff  measures.  The  paper  also  recommends  that  WBG  pursue  an  open  non-
discriminatory trade policy with respect to Jordan.
With respect to  the  labor  market,  the paper  recommends  that  the PA  establish  a
system of fee-based permits  for Palestinian labor  working in Israel  and  that it consider
providing Jordanian workers access to the WBG labor market.
More generally,  a newly independent  Palestinian  state has the  choice of becoming
an  open,  market-oriented,  competitive  and  dynamic  economy,  with  a  government
enforcing  simple, transparent  and  uniform  rules  that apply  to  all.  This will enable  the
entire population to share the fruits of economic  growth. The alternative of a government
subject  to  successful  rent-seeking  activities  and  providing  special  favors  to  various
interest groups is likely to result in economic stagnation,  with negative consequences  for
the stability and the well-being of WBG and the region as a whole.
2 7 Thanks are due to Peter Robson for providing this information.
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36Table 1. VBG Loss of CU and FTA as Compared to NDTP,'
and of Access  to Israel's Labor Market (in $ million)
1.0  Customs Union (CU)
1.1  Losses
1.1.1  Indirect Imports
- Loss of tariff and purchase tax revenues  133
- Excess leakage of VAT revenues  41
Total  174
1.1.2  Transfers
- No Smuggling:  Loss  200
Gain  64
Net  136
- Smuggling:  Loss  160
Gain  64
Net  96
- Total Losses:  No Smuggling  310
Smuggling  270
1.2  Gains
Border Costs Savings  48
1.3  Net Loss





- No Smuggling:  136
- Smuggling:  96
2.1.2  Rules of Origin
- Cost to exporters  3-5%
of import value from all
FTA partners:  84 to 140
- Other costs (trade
diversion,  and other):  X (not quantifiable)
2.1.3  Total Losses:  (180 + X)  to (276 + X)
3.0  Access  to Israel's Labor Market
Benefit:  395
NDTP=non-discriminatory  trade policy with tariffs at present MFN rates. Gains of NDTP would be larger
if trade policy were further liberalized,  though the risk with a NDTP is that it may turn protectionist and be
worse than a CU.
37Avvendix
West Bank-Gaza Imports of Services from Israel ($000,  1998)*
Total  Tradable
P-E  Electricity, gas, water supply  138604  0
P-F  Construction  0  0
P-G.5020  Maintenance and repair of motor vehicles  296  0
P-G.5050  Retail sale of automotive fuel  0  0
P-G.50R  Sale of motor vehicles and parts  0  0
P-G.51  Wholesale  0  0
P-G.5260  Repair of personal and household goods  2362  0
P-G.52R  Other retail sale  0  0
P-H  Hotels, restaurants  61548  30774
P-l  Transport, storage, communications  88159  44080
P-1.6411  National post activities  1069  0
P-1.64R  Remaining communication  45399  22700
P-J.651 1  Central banking  0  0
P-J.6519  Other monetary intermediation  46  0
P-J.660  Insurance,  pension funding, except compulsory social security  12017  0
P-J.R  Other fin. interm., auxiliary activities  0  0
P-K  Real estate, renting, business activities  69436  0
P-L  Public administration, defence; compulsory social security  28924  0
P-M  Education  7867  0
P-N  Health, social work  31518  0
P-O  Other community, social,  personal service activities  4490  0
P-P  Private households with employed persons  0  0
Total  491,734  97554
* The calculation of tradables assumes that half of
categories P-H,  P-I  and P-1.64R consist of tradables.
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